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Abstract 
We study housing and debt in a quantitative general equilibrium model. In the 
cross-section, the model matches the wealth distribution, the age profiles of 
homeownership and mortgage debt, and the frequency of housing adjustment. In the 
time-series, the model matches the procyclicality and volatility of housing 
investment, and the procyclicality of mortgage debt. We use the model to conduct 
two experiments. First, we investigate the consequences of higher individual 
income risk and lower downpayments, and find that these two changes can explain, 
in the model and in the data, the reduced volatility of housing investment, the 
reduced procyclicality of mortgage debt, and a small fraction of the reduced 
volatility of GDP. Second, we use the model to look at the behavior of housing 
investment and mortgage debt in an experiment that mimics the Great Recession: 
we find that countercyclical financial conditions can account for large drops in 
housing activity and mortgage debt when the economy is hit by large negative 
shocks. 
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This paper studies the business cycle and the life-cycle properties of housing investment and 21
household mortgage debt in a quantitative general equilibrium model. To this end, we modify a 22
life-cycle model with uninsurable individual income risk to allow for aggregate uncertainty and 23
for an explicit treatment of housing. We introduce housing by modeling its role as collateral, its 24
lumpiness, and the choice of renting versus owning; these features have, to a large extent, eluded 25
existing business cycle models of housing. 26
At the cross-sectional level, our model accurately reproduces the U.S. wealth distribution, 27
and replicates the life-cycle pro￿les of housing and nonhousing wealth. The young, the old and 28
the poor are renters and hold few assets; the middle-aged and the wealth-rich are homeowners. 29
For a typical household, the asset portfolio consists of a house and a large mortgage. The model 30
also reproduces frequency and size of individual housing adjustment: because of nonconvex 31
adjustment costs, homeowners change house size infrequently but in large amounts when they 32
do so; renters change house size often, but in smaller amounts. Over the business cycle, the 33
model replicates two empirical characteristics of housing investment: its procyclicality and its 34
high volatility. In addition, the model matches the procyclical behavior of household mortgage 35
debt. To our knowledge, no previous model with rigorous micro-foundations for housing demand 36
has reproduced these regularities in general equilibrium. 37
We use the model to look at the role of the housing market in two events of the recent U.S. 38
macroeconomic history: the Great Moderation and the Great Recession. 39
Debt and Housing in the Great Moderation. We study how higher household income risk 40
and lower downpayments a⁄ect the sensitivity of debt and housing to macroeconomic shocks. 41
Higher risk and the reduction in downpayments occurred around the 1980s, around the beginning 42
of the Great Moderation,1 and are potentially important determinants of housing demand and 43
housing tenure: higher risk should make individuals reluctant to buy large items that are costly 44
1 Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) and Gerardi, Rosen and Willen (2010) discuss the role of ￿nancial reforms,
and Dynan, Elmendorf and Sichel (2007) discuss the evolution of household income volatility.
2to sell in bad times; lower downpayments should encourage and smooth housing demand. Their 45
role could be relevant given two observations on the post-1980s period (see Figure 1 and Table 1). 46
First, the volatility of housing investment has fallen more than proportionally relative to GDP; 47
second, the correlations between mortgage debt and GDP and mortgage debt and aggregate 48
consumption have roughly halved, from 0:78 to 0:43 and from 0:72 to 0:37 respectively.2 In line 49
with the data, we ￿nd that lower downpayments and larger idiosyncratic risk reduce the volatility 50
of housing investment, and reduce the correlation between mortgage debt and economic activity. 51
Lower downpayments provide a cushion to smooth housing demand; increase homeownership 52
rates, raising the number of people who do not change their housing consumption over the cycle 53
(relative to an economy with a large number of renters who can become ￿rst-time buyers); lead 54
to higher debt, creating a mechanism that weakens the correlation between output and hours. 55
Higher idiosyncratic risk makes wealth-poor individuals more cautious: these individuals adjust 56
consumption, hours, and housing by smaller amounts in response to aggregate shocks. This 57
mechanism is pronounced for housing purchases, since a house is a large item that is costly 58
to purchase and sell; and is reinforced by low downpayments, since low downpayments allow 59
people to borrow more, increasing the utility cost of buying and selling when net worth is lower. 60
Together, lower downpayments and higher risk can explain about 15 percent of the reduction in 61
the variance of GDP, 60 percent of the reduction in the variance of housing investment, and the 62
decline in the correlation between debt and GDP. 63
Debt and Housing in the Great Recession. During the 2007￿ 2009 period, changes in ￿- 64
nancial conditions are likely to have made the recession worse. In particular, the housing market 65
appears to have been held back ￿more than other sectors ￿by tighter credit conditions and 66
higher borrowing costs. In hindsight, it looks like housing did not stabilize the economy during 67
the recession. We use the model to determine the extent to which housing can smooth regular 68
business cycle shocks but amplify extremely negative ones, by de￿ning ￿Normal Recessions￿as 69
periods of low aggregate productivity, and ￿Great Recessions￿periods of low aggregate produc- 70
2 If one excludes the 2008-2010 period from the time-series, the decline in the volatility of housing investment
and the decline in the correlation between debt and GDP are slightly larger.
3tivity coupled with tight credit conditions. When we do so, we ￿nd an interesting nonlinearity: 71
higher risk and lower downpayments can make housing and debt more stable in response to 72
small positive and negative shocks (as in the Great Moderation), but can make it more fragile 73
in response to large negative shocks (as in the Great Recession). 74
Previous Literature. Two strands of literature study the role of housing in the macroecon- 75
omy. On the one hand, business cycle models with housing ￿Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991), 76
Gomme, Kydland and Rupert (2001), Davis and Heathcote (2005), Fisher (2007) and Iacoviello 77
and Neri (2010) ￿match housing investment well, but abstract from a detailed modeling of 78
the microfoundations of housing demand; these models feature no wealth heterogeneity, no dis- 79
tinction between owning and renting, and unrealistic transaction costs. On the other hand, 80
incomplete markets models with housing ￿Gervais (2002), Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger 81
(2004), Chambers, Garriga and Schlagenhauf (2009), and D￿az and Luengo-Prado (2010) ￿have 82
a rich treatment of the microfoundations of housing demand, but ignore aggregate shocks: how- 83
ever, because these papers model individual heterogeneity, they are better suited to study issues 84
such as debt, risk, and wealth distribution. 85
Our model combines both strands of literature. Others have also done so, albeit with a 86
di⁄erent focus. Silos (2007) studies the link between aggregate shocks and housing choice, but 87
does not model the own/rent decision and assumes convex costs for housing adjustment.3 Fisher 88
and Gervais (2007) ￿nd that the decline in housing investment volatility is driven by a change 89
in the demographics of the population together with an increase in the cross-sectional variance 90
of earnings. Their approach sidesteps general equilibrium considerations. Kiyotaki, Michaelides 91
and Nikolov (2011) use a stylized life-cycle model of housing tenure to study the interaction 92
between borrowing constraints, housing prices, and economic activity. Favilukis, Ludvigson and 93
Van Nieuwerburgh (2009) use a two-sector RBC model with housing that also considers the 94
interaction between borrowing constraints and aggregate activity, but address a di⁄erent set of 95
3 Under convex costs, housing adjustment takes the form of a series of small adjustments over a number of
periods. Under our speci￿cation, the homeowner￿ s housing stock follows an (S;s) rule, remaining unchanged over
a long period and ultimately changing by a potentially large amount. See Carroll and Dunn (1997) for an early
partial equilibrium model with (S;s) behavior for housing.
4questions than we do. Finally, Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) study the impact of ￿nancial 96
innovation on macroeconomic volatility in a model with two household types. In their model, 97
looser collateral constraints weaken the connection between constrained households￿ housing 98
investment, debt accumulation and labor supply through a mechanism that shares some features 99
with ours; however, their model does not study the interaction between life cycle, risk and housing 100
demand, which are important elements of our story. 101
2. The Model 102
Our economy is a version of the stochastic growth model with overlapping generations of hetero- 103
geneous households, extended to allow for housing investment, collateralized debt and a housing 104
rental market. Aggregate uncertainty is introduced in the form of a shock to total factor pro- 105
ductivity. Individuals live at most T periods and work until age e T < T: Their labor endowment 106
depends on a deterministic age-speci￿c productivity and a stochastic component. After retire- 107
ment, people receive a pension. Each period, the probability of surviving from age a to a + 1 108
is ￿a+1. Each period a generation is born of the same measure of dead agents, so that the to- 109
tal population, which we normalize to 1; is constant. When an agent dies, he is replaced by a 110
descendant who inherits his assets. 111
At each point in time, agents di⁄er by their age and productivity; moreover, we assume that 112
agents di⁄er in their degree of impatience. We do so for two reasons: ￿rst, a large literature (see 113
Guvenen, 2011) suggests that preference heterogeneity may be an important source of wealth in- 114
equality. For example, Venti and Wise (2001) study wealth inequality at the onset of retirement 115
among households with similar lifetime earnings and conclude that the dispersion must be at- 116
tributed to di⁄erences in the amount that households choose to save.4 Second, we want a model 117
that generates average debt and wealth dispersion as in the data, and a model with discount 118
factor heterogeneity works remarkably well in this regard (our robustness analysis discusses the 119
properties of the model with a single discount factor). 120
4 Krusell and Smith (1998) explore a heterogeneous-agents setting with discount rate heterogeneity which
replicates key features of the data on the distribution of wealth.
5Household Preferences and Endowments. Households receive utility from consumption 121
c, leisure l ￿ l (where l is the time endowment), and service ￿ ows s from housing, which are 122










Above, ￿ = 1 if s = h > 0 (the individual owns), while ￿ < 1 if h = 0 (the individual rents). 124
The assumption for ￿ implies that a household experiences a utility gain when transitioning from 125
renting to owning, as in Rosen (1985) and Poterba (1992). We also assume that homeowners 126
need to hold a minimum size house h, and that rental units may come in smaller sizes than 127
houses, allowing renters to consume a smaller amount of housing services, as in Gervais (2002). 128
The log speci￿cation over consumption and housing services follows Davis and Ortalo-MagnØ 129
(2011) who ￿nd that, over time and across cities, the expenditure share on housing is constant. 130
Time supplied in the labor market is paid at the wage wt. The productivity endowment of an 131
agent at age a is given by ￿az; where ￿a is a deterministic age-speci￿c component and z is a shock 132
to the e¢ ciency units of labor, z 2 e Z ￿ fz1;:::;zng. The shock follows a Markov process with 133
transition matrix ￿z;z0 = Pr(zt+1 = z0jzt = z) and stationary distribution ￿(z) = Pr(zt = z) . 134
The total amount of labor e¢ ciency units
Pn
i=1 zi￿(zi) and of age-speci￿c productivity values 135
Pe T
a=1 ￿a￿a are constant and normalized to one. From e T + 1 onwards labor e¢ ciency is zero 136
(z = 0) and agents live o⁄ their pension P and their accumulated wealth. Pensions are fully 137
￿nanced through the government￿ s revenues from a lump-sum tax ￿ paid by workers.5 Total net 138
income at age a in period t is denoted by yat. Then: 139
yat = wt￿aztlt ￿ ￿ if a ￿ e T; yat = P if a > e T. (2)
Households start their life with endowments b0 and h0; the accidental bequests left by a dead 140
agent. They can trade a one￿ period bond b which pays a gross interest rate of Rt. Positive 141
amounts of this bond denote a debt position.6 Households cannot borrow more than a fraction 142
5 We crudely assume that the pension is the same for everyone. Allowing pensions to mimic something that
looks like the actual Social Security system in the U.S. would make our model computationally intractable, since
it would enlarge the state variables in the household problem to encompass their entire income history.
6 We refer to b as ￿nancial liabilities, and to ￿b as ￿nancial assets. Because bonds are claims on aggregate
capital, their return varies with the aggregate state.
6mH < 1 of their housing stock and a fraction mY of their expected earnings: 143
bt ￿ minfmHht;mY<t (yat;Rt;wt)g. (3)




(Rt)s￿a approximates the present discounted value of 144
lifetime labor earnings and pension.7 The motivation for this borrowing constraint is realism: 145
we want to study mortgage debt and we want to have a constraint which prevents the elderly 146
from borrowing too much late in life (when the present discounted value of earnings is low), 147
as in the data. The constraint is also consistent with typical lending criteria in the mortgage 148
market that take into account minimum downpayments, ratios of debt payments to income, 149
current and expected future employment conditions.8 Finally, we assume that an owner incurs a 150
transaction cost whenever he adjusts the housing stock: ￿(ht;ht￿1) =  ht￿1 if jht ￿ ht￿1j > 0. 151
This assumption captures common practices in the housing market that require, for instance, 152
fees paid to realtors to be equal to a fraction of the value of the house being sold. Summing up, 153












where E1 denotes expectations at age a = 1, ￿a is a deterministic preference shifter that mimics 155
changes in household size, and ￿i is a household-speci￿c discount factor. In the calibration, we 156
assume that households are born either impatient (low ￿) or patient (high ￿). 157
Financial Sector and Housing Rental Market. A competitive ￿nancial sector collects 158
deposits from households who save, lends to ￿rms and households who borrow, and buys capital 159
to be rented in the same period to tenants. The ￿nancial sector can convert the ￿nal good into 160
housing and capital at no cost. This assumption ensures that the consumption prices of housing 161
and capital are constant. Let pt be the price of one unit of rental services. Then a no-arbitrage 162
condition holds such that the net revenue from lending one unit of ￿nancial capital must equal 163
7 To compute <t, we ￿x interest and wages at current values. To compute yat; we assume lt = l for t ￿ e T.
8 In the United States, lending institutions typically send a ￿Veri￿cation of Employment￿(VOE) form to the
borrower￿ s employer to determine start date of employment, current and previous salary, and the probability of
continued employment among other things.
7the net revenue from renting one unit of housing capital, 164
pt = 1 ￿ Et ((1 ￿ ￿H)=Rt+1) (5)
at any t; where ￿H is the depreciation rate of the housing stock.9
165
Production. The goods market is competitive and characterized by constant returns to scale, 166






where K and L are total capital and labor input; ￿ is the capital share, and A 2 e A ￿ fA1;::;AnAg 168
is a shock to total factor productivity. This shock follows a Markov process with transition matrix 169
￿A;A0 = Pr(At+1 = A0jAt = A). The aggregate feasibility constraint requires that production of 170
the good Yt equals the sum of aggregate consumption Ct; investment in the stock of aggregate 171
capital Kt; investment in the stock of aggregate housing Ht = Ho
t + Hr
t ; and total transaction 172
costs incurred by homeowners for changing housing stock, denoted by ￿t: 173
Ct + Ht ￿ (1 ￿ ￿H)Ht￿1 + ￿t + Kt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿K)Kt￿1 = Yt; (7)
with ￿H and ￿K denoting the depreciation rates of housing and capital, respectively. 174
The Household Problem and Equilibrium. Denote with ￿t ￿ ￿t (zt;bt￿1;ht￿1;￿;a) the 175
distribution of households over earnings shocks, asset holdings, housing wealth, discount factors 176
and ages in period t: Without aggregate uncertainty, the economy would be in a stationary 177
equilibrium, with an invariant distribution ￿ and constant prices. Given aggregate volatility, this 178
distribution will change over time. When solving their dynamic optimization problem, agents 179
need to predict future wages and interest rates. Both variables depend on future productivity 180
and aggregate capital-labor ratio, which in turn are determined by the overall distribution of 181
9 One can interpret the marginal cost of one house to be 1 for the ￿nancial sector, since loanable funds can
be converted into housing costlessly; and the marginal bene￿t to be the sum of the current rental income, pt,
plus expected return next period, Et ((1 ￿ ￿H)=Rt+1), where Rt is the opportunity cost of funds for the ￿nancial
sector. Equating costs and bene￿ts yields equation (5).
8individual states. As a consequence, the distribution ￿t ￿and its law of motion ￿is one of the 182
aggregate state variables that agents need to know in order to make their decisions (together 183
with total factor productivity). This distribution is an in￿nite-dimensional object, and its law 184
of motion maps an in￿nite-dimensional space onto itself, which imposes a crucial complication 185
for the solution of the model economy. To circumvent this problem, we adopt the strategy of 186
Krusell and Smith (1998) and let agents use one moment of the distribution ￿ ￿the aggregate 187
capital stock K ￿in order to forecast future prices. As documented in Appendix A, using one 188
moment only allows us to obtain a fairly precise forecast, as measured by the R2 of the forecasting 189
equations, which are between 0:99 and 1.10
190
We write the household optimization problem recursively. The individual states are pro- 191
ductivity zt; debt bt￿1; and housing wealth ht￿1. We assume that agents observe beginning of 192
period capital Kt￿1 and approximate the evolution of aggregate capital and labor with linear 193
functions that depend on the aggregate shock At: Denote xt ￿ (zt;bt￿1;ht￿1;At;Kt￿1) the vector 194
of individual and aggregate states. The dynamic problem of an age a household is: 195













a and V r
a are the value functions if the agent owns and rents, respectively, and Ih = 1
corresponds to the decision to own. The value of being a homeowner solves:
V
h








z0;A0 ￿A;A0￿z;z0Va+1 (xt+1;￿i)g (9)
s.t. ct + ht + ￿(ht;ht￿1) = yat + bt ￿ Rtbt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿H)ht￿1;






K (Kt￿1;At); Lt = z
L (Kt￿1;At).
Here zK and zL are linear functions in Kt￿1; whose parameters depend on the At. They denote 196
10 We have examined the robustness of our results by letting agents use both the aggregate capital stock K
and the housing stock H in forecasting future prices, with nearly identical results, but at a higher computational
cost. It is possible that higher moments of the wealth distribution could be both relevant in predicting future
prices and yield di⁄erent aggregate dynamics, so that our decision rules would describe a bounded rationality
equilibrium, rather than a good approximation to the rational expectations equilibrium. Yet the evidence that
adding H to the set of the state variables does not change aggregate dynamics leads us to be skeptical of this
interpretation. See Young (2010) for an insightful discussion of these issues.
9the law of motion of the aggregate state, which agents take as given. 197
The value of renting a house is determined by solving the problem:
V
r








z0;A0 ￿A;A0￿z;z0Va+1 (xt+1;￿i)g (10)
s.t. ct + ptst + ￿(0;ht￿1) = yat + bt ￿ Rtbt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿H)ht￿1;






K (Kt￿1;At); Lt = z
L (Kt￿1;At):
At the agent￿ s last age, VT+1 (xT+1;￿) = 0 for any (xT+1;￿). 198
We are now ready to de￿ne the equilibrium for this economy. 199
De￿nition 2.1. A recursive competitive equilibrium consists of value functions fVa(xt;￿)ga=1;::;T;t=1;::;1 ; 200
policy functions fIh
a (xt;￿);ha (xt;￿);sa (xt;￿);ba (xt;￿);ca (xt;￿);la (xt;￿)g for each ￿; age 201
and period t, prices Rt, wt and pt; aggregate quantities Kt;Lt;Ho
t and Hr
t for each t; taxes 202
￿ and pensions P; and laws of motion zK and zL such that at any t: 203
Agents optimize: Given Rt, wt; pt; and the laws of motion zK and zL, the value functions 204
solve the individual￿ s problem, with the corresponding policy functions. 205
Factor prices and rental prices satisfy:
Rt ￿ 1 + ￿K = ￿At (Kt￿1=Lt)
￿￿1 ; (11)
wt = (1 ￿ ￿)At(Kt￿1=Lt)
￿; (12)




la (xt;￿)￿aztd￿t (labor market), (14)
Ct + Ht ￿ (1 ￿ ￿H)Ht￿1 + ￿t + Kt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿K)Kt￿1 = Yt (goods market) (15)





















a=e T+1 ￿aP. (18)
The laws of motion for the aggregate capital and aggregate labor are given by 207
Kt = z
K (Kt￿1;At); Lt = z
L (Kt￿1;At). (19)
Appendix A provides the details on our computational strategy. 208
3. Calibration 209
Our calibration is summarized in Table 2. One period is a year. Agents enter the model at 210
age 21; retire at age 65; and die no later than age 90. The survival probabilities correspond to 211
the survival probabilities for men aged 21-90 from the U.S. Decennial Life Tables for 1989-1991. 212
Each period, the measure of those who are born is equal to the measure of those who die. The 213
age polynomial ￿a, which captures the e⁄ect of demographic variables in the utility function, 214
is taken from Cagetti (2003) and approximated using a fourth-order polynomial (see Figure 2). 215
After normalizing the household size to 1 at age 21, the household size peaks at 2:5 at age 40, 216
and declines thereafter. 217
We take the deterministic pro￿le of e¢ ciency units of labor for males aged 21￿65 from Hansen 218
(1993) and approximate it using a quadratic polynomial (see Figure 2). Upon retirement, an 219
agent receives a pension equal to 40 percent of the average labor income.11 The idiosyncratic 220
shock to labor productivity is speci￿ed as: 221





￿1=2 "t; "t ￿ Normal(0;1), (20)
which we approximate with a three-state Markov process following Tauchen (1986). There is 222
a vast literature on the nature and speci￿cation of a parsimonious yet empirically plausible 223
income process: the bulk of the studies (see Guvenen, 2011) look at earnings (rather than wages) 224
11 Queisser and Whitehouse (2005) report that average pensions for males in the United States are 40 percent
of the economy-wide average earnings.
11and estimate persistence coe¢ cients ranging from 0:7 to 0:95. Exception are Floden and LindØ 225
(2001), who use PSID data to estimate an AR(1) process for wages similar to ours and ￿nd 226
an autocorrelation coe¢ cient of 0:91; and Card (1991), who ￿nds an AR(1) coe¢ cient of 0:89. 227
Based on this evidence, we set ￿Z = 0:9; and conduct robustness analysis in Section 8, based 228
on evidence from other studies that we review in Appendix B. The standard deviation of the 229
labor productivity process is set at ￿Z = 0:30 (see Appendix B). Later, we increase ￿Z to 0:45 230
to capture the increased earnings volatility of the 1990s, and to study the consequences for 231
macroeconomic aggregates of increased risk at the household level, as emphasized by Mo¢ tt and 232
Gottschalk (2008) and Dynan, Elmendorf and Sichel (2007). 233
We assume that there are two classes of households, a ￿patient￿group with a discount factor 234
of 0:999 (one third of the population) and an ￿impatient￿group with a discount factor of 0:941 235
(two thirds of the population). The high discount factor pins the average real interest rate down 236
to 3 percent. The low discount factor is in the range of estimates in the literature (see, for 237
instance, Hendricks, 2007). The gap between discount rates and the relative population shares 238
deliver a Gini coe¢ cient for wealth around 0:75, close to the data. In Section 8 we discuss the 239
properties of the model when we assume that all people have identical discount rates. We set 240
￿ = 1:65 and the endowment of time l = 2:65; these parameters imply that time spent working 241
is 40 percent of the agents￿time. 242
We set the weight on housing in utility at j = 0:15; and the depreciation rate for housing 243
￿H = 0:05. These parameters yield average housing investment to private output ratios around 244
7 percent, and a ratio of the housing stock to output 1:4. These values are in accordance with 245
the National Income and Product Accounts and the Fixed Assets Tables.12 Finally, the housing 246
transaction cost is set at   = 5% based on estimates from the National Association of Realtors 247
12 The NIPA Fixed Asset Tables indicate depreciation rates for housing ranging from 1.2 to 4.5 percent,
depending on the type of structure and its use (see Fraumeni, 1997). We choose a slightly higher value because
we want to account for unmeasured labor time that is used to repair, renovate, or maintain or improve the
quality of housing at a given location (Peek and Wilcox, 1991); because higher values are typically considered in
the existing literature, especially when housing is broadly interpreted to include consumer durables (Chambers,
Garriga and Schlagenhauf, 2009, Gervais 2002, and D￿az and JosØ Luengo-Prado, 2010); and because a higher
depreciation rate (5 percent instead of 2 percent, say) reduces the extent to which aggregate housing tends to
decrease on impact following a positive aggregate technology shock in a model with two capital goods.
12(2005).13 Section 8 conducts robustness analysis for alternative values of   and ￿H. 248
We set ￿ = 0:26 and ￿K = 0:09: These values yield an average capital to output ratios 249
around 2:2 and average business investment to output ratios around 20 percent. The aggregate 250
shock is calibrated to match the standard deviation of output in the data for the period 1952- 251
1982. We use a Markov-chain speci￿cation with seven states to match the following ￿rst-order 252
autoregression for the log of total factor productivity: 253





￿1=2 "t; "t ￿ Normal(0;1). (21)
We set ￿A = 0:925 and ￿A = 0:0148. After rounding, the ￿rst number mimics a quarterly 254
autocorrelation rate of productivity of 0:979; as in King and Rebelo (1999). The second number 255
is chosen to match the standard deviation of model output to its data counterpart. 256
Our baseline calibration sets the maximum loan-to-value ratio mH at 0:75. We increase mH 257
to 0:85 in the calibration for the late period. The value of mY is set at 0:25 in the baseline 258
and raised to 0:5 in the late period: with these numbers, the income constraint only binds 259
late in life, preventing old homeowners from borrowing. Aside from this, our choice for mY is of 260
small importance for the model dynamics. Lastly, the minimum-size house available for purchase 261
(h) costs 1:5 times the average annual pre-tax household income.14 Together with the minimum 262
house size, the parameter that has a large impact on homeownership is the utility penalty for 263
renting (￿). We set ￿ = 0:838 to obtain a homeownership rate of 64 percent, as in the data for 264
the period 1952-1982. 265
4. Steady-State Results 266
Household Behavior. At each stage in the life, the household chooses consumption, saving, 267
hours, and housing investment by taking into account current and expected income, and liquid 268
13 The National Association of Realtors estimates that average commission rates (excluding houses sold without
brokers, which account for about 10 to 25 percent of existing home sales, according to media reports, reports of
the National Association of Realtors, and academic studies) range from 4:3 to 5:4 percent, based on 2004 data
documenting a $65 billion brokerage industry and an existing home sales volume of $1.35 trillion.
14 According to the 2009 American Housing Survey, only 20 percent of total owner-occupied units have a ratio
to current income less than 1.5.
13assets and housing position at the beginning of the period. Here, we mostly focus on housing 269
decisions, since other features of the model are in line with existing models of life-cycle consump- 270
tion and saving behavior. We defer illustrating labor supply behavior to the next section, when 271
we discuss the model dynamics in response to aggregate shocks. 272
It is simple to characterize the behavior of agents depending on whether they start the period 273
as renters or homeowners. For renters, the housing choice is as follows: given the initial state, 274
there is a threshold amount of liquid assets (￿b in our notation) such that, if assets exceed the 275
threshold, renters become homeowners. Also, the larger initial liquid assets are, the less likely a 276
household is to borrow to ￿nance its housing purchase. 277
Homeowners can stay put, increase house size, downsize or switch to renting. Figure 3 plots 278
optimal housing choice as a function of initial house size and liquid wealth.15 The downward 279
sloping line plots the borrowing constraint that restricts debt from exceeding a fraction mH 280
of its housing stock. As the ￿gure illustrates, larger liquid assets trigger larger housing. In 281
addition, buying and selling costs create a region of inaction where the household keeps its 282
housing constant. If liquid wealth falls, the household either downsizes or switches to renting. 283
One feature of the model is that, for a household with very small liquid assets, the housing 284
tenure decision is non-monotonic in the initial level of housing wealth. Consider, for instance, a 285
homeowner with liquid assets equal to about one. If the initial house size is small, the homeowner 286
does not change house size, since, given the small amount of assets, the house size is closer to 287
its optimal choice. If the initial house is medium-sized, the homeowner pays the adjustment cost 288
and, because of his low liquid assets, switches to renting. If the initial house size is large, it is 289
optimal to downsize, and to buy a smaller house. 290
Life-Cycle Pro￿les. Figure 4 plots a typical individual life-cycle pro￿le in our model. We 291
choose an agent with a low discount factor since the behavior of an agent with low assets and 292
often close to the borrowing constraint best illustrates the main workings of the model. The 293
agent starts life as a renter, with little assets and low income. At the age of 22; he is hit by a 294
15 The ￿gure is plotted for a patient agent who is entering retirement (65 years old), when aggregate productivity
and the capital-labor ratio are equal to their average value.
14positive income shock, saves in order to a⁄ord the downpayment and buys a house a year after. 295
Prior to buying a house, the individual works more: the positive income shock raises the incentive 296
to work; and such incentive is reinforced by need to set resources aside for the downpayment. 297
Following a series of above average income shocks beginning at the age of 32; the agent buys a 298
larger house at the age of 39. This time, in order to a⁄ord the larger house, the individual is 299
much closer to his borrowing limit. In particular, while he owns and is close to the borrowing 300
limit, hours move in the opposite direction to wage shocks, rising in bad times (age 42), falling 301
in good times (age 45): such mechanism is explained in detail in the next Section. As retirement 302
approaches, the agent pays back part of the mortgage, and works more. After retirement, at the 303
age of 70; he switches to a small rental unit, before dying at the age of 90. 304
One dimension where it is illustrative to compare the model with the data is the frequency 305
of housing adjustment for homeowners.16 Using the 1993 Survey of Income and Program Partic- 306
ipation, Hansen (1998) reports that the median homeowner stays in the same house for about 8 307
years. Anily, Hornik, and Israeli (1999) estimate that the average homeowner lives in the same 308
residence for 13 years. The corresponding number for our model is 15 years.17
309
Figure 5 compares the age pro￿les of housing, debt and homeownership with their empirical 310
counterparts. Like the data, the model is able to capture the hump-shaped pro￿les of these 311
variables. There are two discrepancies: as for mortgage debt, the model slightly underpredicts 312
debt early in life, and overpredicts debt later in life. The model also underpredicts homeownership 313
later in life: we believe that, late in life, the absence of any bequest motive and the need to 314
￿nance consumption expenditure by selling the house more than o⁄set the adjustment costs, 315
thus generating a sharp decline in homeownership. 316
The Wealth Distribution. Our model reproduces the U.S. wealth distribution quite well. 317
The Lorenz curves for the U.S. economy and for our model economy are reported in ￿gure 6. 318
16 In the model, renters change their housing position every period, since they face no cost in doing so. This
assumption is in line with the data, that show that on average renters move about every two years.
17 We are aware, of course, of the di¢ culty in comparing the model with the data along this dimension: in the
data, 15 percent of the moves are associated with a move to a di⁄erent state, and 35 percent of the moves are
associated with a move to a di⁄erent county. Most of these moves are probably ￿moving shocks￿rather than
movements along the housing ladder.
15The Gini coe¢ cient for wealth in the model is 0:73, and is about the same as in the data (equal 319
to 0:79). Our model still underpredicts wealth inequality at the very top of the distribution, 320
both for housing and for total wealth. However, the model does well at matching the fraction 321
of wealth (both housing wealth and overall wealth) held by the poorest 40 percent of the U.S. 322
population, which has essentially no assets and no debt. Instead, a model without preference 323
heterogeneity would do much worse: in Section 8 we show that the Gini coe¢ cient for wealth in 324
the model with a single discount factor is 0:53, much lower than in the data. 325
In the same vein, the model predicts a mortgage debt to GDP ratio that is roughly in line 326
with the data (0:31 vs. 0:34) and a fraction of liquidity constrained agents that is consistent with 327
the available empirical estimates. Following Hall (2011), we take a model agent to be liquidity- 328
constrained if the holdings of net liquid assets are less than two months (16.67% on an annual 329
basis) of income.18 Using this de￿nition, 45% of households are liquidity constrained.19 Jappelli 330
(1990) estimates the share of liquidity constrained individuals to be 20%. Studies that have 331
combined self￿ reported measures of credit constraints from the Survey of Consumer Finances 332
with indirect inference from other datasets (such as the PSID), have typically found that 20 333
percent is more likely to be a lower bound. For instance, using evidence on the response of 334
spending to changes in credit card limits, Gross and Souleles (2002) argue that the overall 335
fraction of potentially constrained households is over two thirds. 336
5. Business Cycle Results 337
We now illustrate the propagation mechanism of aggregate shocks. There are two aspects of 338
heterogeneity that matter for aggregate dynamics: one is exogenous, and re￿ ects the assump- 339
tion that individuals have di⁄erent abilities, planning horizons, and utility weights. Because 340
other papers have studied these features in life-cycle models with aggregate shocks, we do not 341
18 Liquid assets are de￿ned as lqas ￿ mHh0 ￿b0: According to this de￿nition, an owner (h0 > 0) is not liquidity
constrained so long as it saves su¢ ciently more (borrows less) than the minimum downpayment in the house
(lqas > 0:1667y); a renter (h0 = 0) is not constrained if ￿nancial assets are su¢ ciently large (b0 < ￿0:1667y).
19 The baseline model predicts that 70 percent of renters and 31 percent of homeowners are liquidity constrained;
and that 67 percent of impatient agents and 2 percent of patient agents are liquidity constrained.
16explore them in detail here.20 Instead, we focus on the endogenous component of heterogeneity, 342
which re￿ ects the fact that individuals with di⁄erent ages and income histories accumulate dif- 343
ferent amounts of wealth over time; in turn, heterogeneity in wealth implies di⁄erent individual 344
responses to the same shock. 345
Workings of the Model. We focus on the response of aggregate hours to a technology shock, 346
since movements in hours are the key element of the propagation mechanism in models that 347
rely on technology shocks as sources of aggregate ￿ uctuations. In particular, we study how 348
the wealth distribution and its composition shape agents￿responses to shocks. To ￿x ideas, 349
consider a stripped-down version of the budget constraint of a working individual that keeps 350
wealth constant between two periods: bt = bt￿1 and ht = ht￿1.21 Abstracting from taxes and 351
pensions, this implies the following budget constraint: 352
ct = wt￿aztlt + ￿t; (22)
where ￿t = ￿(Rt ￿ 1)bt￿1 ￿ ￿Hht￿1 measures the resources besides wages that can be used to 353
￿nance consumption:22 the term (1 ￿ R)b is net interest income; the term ￿Hh is the maintenance 354
cost required to keep housing unchanged. Di⁄erent values of ￿ map into di⁄erent positions of the 355
agents along the wealth distribution. For a wealthy homeowner (negative b), ￿ is positive and 356
large, and wage income is a small fraction of consumption c. For a renter, h = 0; in addition, 357
assuming that the renter is not saving, b = 0, so that ￿ = 0 too. For a homeowner with a 358
mortgage (positive b), ￿ is negative. Normalize ￿a = 1 and set aside idiosyncratic shocks, so 359
that zt = 1 at all times. Assuming that ￿ stays constant, the log-linearized budget constraint 360
becomes, denoting with b x ￿ xt￿x





b w +b l
￿
. (23)
20 See for instance the work of R￿os-Rull (1996) and Gomme et al. (2004).
21 Obviously, the optimal decisions involve the joint choice of (1) consumption, (2) housing, (3) debt and (4)
hours worked. By assuming that housing and debt remain constant across two subperiods, we can study the joint
determination of consumption and hours by focusing on the budget constraint and the Euler equation for labor
supply only. This is a reasonable assumption for small shocks (such as aggregate shocks).
22 Renters have constant shares of housing and nonhousing consumption, so that ct = (wt￿aztlt + ￿t)=(1 + j);
where j is the ratio of housing expenditure to nondurable consumption. With minor modi￿cations, the arguments
in the text carry over to this case, since ￿ cannot be negative for renters:
17This constraint can be interpreted as an equation dictating how much the household needs to 362
work to ￿nance a given consumption stream, given the wage. The larger the desired consumption 363
b c; the larger the required hours b l needed to ￿nance the consumption stream, with an elasticity 364
of hours to consumption given by consumption￿ wage income ratio (c=wl) ￿ ￿. For a wealthy 365
individual, ￿ is high and larger than one, since labor income is a small share of total earnings; 366
for a renter without assets, ￿ = 1; for an indebted homeowner, ￿ < 1, re￿ ecting the need to use 367
part of the earnings to ￿nance maintenance costs and to service the mortgage. In other words, 368
a wealthy person needs to increase hours by more than 1 percent to ￿nance a 1 percent rise 369
in consumption, since labor income is less than consumption; an indebted homeowner needs to 370
increase hours by less than 1 percent to ￿nance a 1 percent rise in consumption, because of the 371
leverage e⁄ect; a renter without assets needs to increase hours 1 for 1 with consumption. 372
The other key equation determining hours is the standard labor supply schedule. Letting ￿ 373
denote the steady-state Frisch labor supply elasticity, this curve reads as 374
b l = ￿ (b w ￿ b c). (24)
Combining equations 23 and 24 yields: 375






Take the wage as the exogenous driving force of the model, since an exogenous rise in productivity 376
exerts a direct e⁄ect on the wage. Whether the rise in the wage leads to an increase in hours 377
depends on whether the consumption￿ wage income ratio, ￿; is smaller or larger than one. In 378
other words, all else equal, borrowers (￿ < 1) are more likely to reduce hours following a positive 379
wage shock, whereas savers (￿ > 1) are more likely to increase them. 380
For the economy as a whole, the response of total hours to a wage change will be an average 381
of the labor supply responses of all households. If individual labor schedules were linear in 382
net wealth, the aggregate labor supply response would be linear in average wealth, and wealth 383
distribution would not a⁄ect labor supply. There are, however, two main forces that undo the 384
linearity. First, retirees do not work, so any transfer of wealth to and from them could a⁄ect how 385
18the workers respond to wage shocks. Second, the interaction between borrowing constraints and 386
housing purchases creates an interesting nonlinearity. Above, we have assumed that households 387
do not change wealth in response to a shock in the wage. However, if households switch from 388
renting to owning (or if they increase their house size) in good times, they typically need to 389
save for the downpayment. This increases the incentive to work: intuitively, if the individual 390
wants to keep consumption constant when he buys the house, he needs to work more hours. This 391
e⁄ect creates comovement between hours and housing purchases.23 In particular, it reinforces the 392
correlation between hours and housing demand in periods when a large fraction of the population 393
has, all else equal, low net worth. 394
Business Cycle Statistics. In HP-￿ltered U.S. data, the variability of housing investment is 395
large, with a standard deviation that is between three and four times that of GDP (in the period 396
1952-1982). Also, housing investment is procyclical, with a correlation with GDP around 0:9. 397
Together, these two facts imply that the growth contribution of housing investment to the busi- 398
ness cycle is larger than its share of GDP. Household mortgage debt is strongly procyclical from 399
1952 to 1982, but it becomes less procyclical after, with a correlation with GDP that drops from 400
0:78 to 0:43. Table 3 compares the benchmark model with the data. Overall, our baseline model 401
does a good job in reproducing the relative volatility of each component of aggregate demand. 402
In particular, it can account for about three quarters of the variance of housing investment. On 403
the contrary, the model overpredicts the volatility of aggregate consumption. The volatility of 404
business investment is only slightly lower than in the data. As in many RBC models without an 405
extensive margin of work and without direct shocks to the labor supply, our model underpredicts 406
the volatility of hours (0:33 percent in the model, 1:6 percent in the data). 407
Turning to debt, the model does well in reproducing its cyclical behavior.24 The key to this 408
result is that the bulk of the debt holders (mostly impatients) upgrades housing in good times 409
23 The limiting case of zero forced savings would be the case in which no downpayment is needed to buy a
house. In that case the individual can keep consumption constant at the time of the purchase without increasing
hours worked if transaction costs are zero. If the individual has to pay the transaction cost, this provides an
incentive to work more at the time of the purchase. Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) propose a similar argument
to discuss the relationship between hours and durable purchases.
24 We de￿ne household debt as Dt =
R
b>0 ba (xt;￿)d￿t (that is, the average of the household liabilities).
19by taking out a (larger) mortgage. At the same time, the model overpredicts the volatility of 410
debt itself: the standard deviation of the model variable is about four times larger than in the 411
data. We suspect that the reason for the higher volatility of debt in the model has to do with 412
the simplifying assumption that only one ￿nancial asset is available, whereas in the data some 413
households (especially the wealthy) own simultaneously a mortgage and other ￿nancial assets. If 414
debt of low-wealth households is more volatile than debt of high-wealth households, our model 415
variable can exhibit more volatility than its data counterpart. 416
One dimension where it is useful to compare the model with the data pertains to home sales. 417
In our model, we count a sale as every instance in which a household pays the transaction cost to 418
change its housing: this involves own-to-own, rent-to-own and own-to-rent transitions. By this 419
metric, the average turnover rate in the model (the ratio of sales to total houses) is 4 percent, 420
a number that matches the 3:9 percent in the data.25 Moreover, the model correlation between 421
turnover rate and GDP is 0:39, and the standard deviation is 0:29. The corresponding numbers 422
from the data are 0:69 and 0:54. The positive correlation between sales and economic activity 423
that the model captures re￿ ects the presence of liquidity constraints: when the economy is in 424
recession and household balance sheets have deteriorated, the potential movers in the model ￿nd 425
their liquidity so impaired, whether they are owners or renters, that they are better o⁄ staying 426
in their old house rather than attempting to move and paying the transaction cost. 427
6. E⁄ects of Lower Downpayments and Higher Risk 428
Having shown above that the model roughly captures postwar U.S. business cycles, we now 429
consider the implications of two experiments. In the ￿rst, we lower the downpayment from 25 to 430
15 percent. In the second, we increase the idiosyncratic risk faced by households, changing the 431
unconditional standard deviation of income ￿Z from 0:30 to 0:45. Our experiment is intended 432
to mirror two of the main changes that have occurred in the U.S. economy since the mid 1980s. 433
25 The turnover rate in the data is constructed as the sum of sales of existing single-family homes (source:
National Association of Realtors) plus new single-family homes sold (from Census Bureau), divided by the total
housing stock (from Census Bureau). The series starts in 1968.
20The model results are in Table 4. 434
A Decline in Downpayments. Lower downpayments (column 2 in Table 4) lead to an in- 435
crease in the homeownership rate (from 64 to 76 percent) and to a higher level of debt (from 31 436
to 50 percent of GDP). Smaller downpayments allow more housing ownership among the portion 437
of the population with very little net worth. While debt is higher, the increase in homeowner- 438
ship works to keep total wealth inequality unchanged: ￿nancial wealth inequality is higher, but 439
housing wealth inequality is lower. Turning to business cycles, the rise in mH tends to reduce the 440
volatility of housing investment, from 6:42 to 5:94 percent, for two reasons. The ￿rst reason has 441
to do with adjustment costs: on average, because of adjustment costs, homeowners modify their 442
housing little over time relative to renters. The second motive operates through the interaction 443
of labor supply and housing purchases. As we explained above, indebted homeowners are more 444
likely, compared to renters, to reduce hours in response to positive technology shocks, so their 445
presence dampens aggregate shocks. Therefore, the higher homeownership rate induced by looser 446
borrowing constraints reduces aggregate volatility.26
447
An Increase in Individual Earnings Volatility. Column 3 in Table 4 shows that, following 448
a rise in ￿Z, the homeownership rate falls from 64 to 59 percent: higher risk makes individuals 449
more reluctant to buy an asset that is costly to change. All else equal, the lower homeownership 450
rate would tend to increase the volatility of housing investment, since renters change housing 451
consumption more often. However, this e⁄ect is more than o⁄set by the behavior of those who 452
remain homeowners: these people are now more reluctant to change their housing consumption 453
(relative to a world with less individual risk). This occurs because modifying housing, in the 454
26 A similar intuition has been proposed in Campbell and Hercowitz (2005), who show that ￿nancial innovation
alone can explain more than half of the reduction in aggregate volatility in a model with borrowers and lenders
and downpayment constraints. Aside from modeling di⁄erences (our model considers the owning/renting margin
and addresses issues related to life cycle, lumpiness and risk that are absent in their setup), the intuition they
o⁄er for their result carries over to our model, but we ￿nd that the e⁄ect of lower downpayment requirements
is quantitatively smaller. We conjecture that the di⁄erences depend on one modeling assumption: in our setup,
indebted homeowners mitigate aggregate volatility, but this e⁄ect is partly o⁄set by the wealthier homeowners (the
creditors) who tend to increase aggregate volatility by working relatively more in response to positive aggregate
shocks; instead, Campbell and Hercowitz assume that labor supply of wealthy homeowners is constant, thus
killing this o⁄setting mechanism.
21presence of transaction costs, depletes holdings of liquid assets and increases the utility cost of 455
a negative idiosyncratic shock, thus increasing the option value of not adjusting the stock for 456
given changes in net worth. Quantitatively, the higher earnings volatility reduces the standard 457
deviation of housing investment from 6:42 to 5:52 percent. Moreover, higher income volatility 458
also reduces the sensitivity of debt to aggregate shocks, since debt is used to ￿nance housing 459
purchases, and housing purchases respond less to shocks. 460
Combining Lower Downpayments and Higher Volatility. The last column of Table 4 461
shows the e⁄ects of combining lower downpayments and higher volatility. The two forces together 462
predict an increase in homeownership rates from 64 to 67 percent. The data counterpart is a 463
two percentage points rise, from 64 to 66 percent. Moreover, the joint e⁄ect of these two forces 464
makes debt less procyclical, as in the data. The correlation between debt and output falls from 465
0:71 to 0:39; a change that is remarkably similar to the data (from 0:78 to 0:43, see Table 1).27
466
Together, lower downpayments and high idiosyncratic volatility reduce the standard deviation 467
of GDP from 2:09 to 2:03 percent, and the standard deviation of housing investment from 6:42 468
to 5:04. percent. When these numbers are compared to the data, the two changes combined can 469
account for 13 percent of the variance reduction in GDP and about 60 percent of the variance 470
reduction in housing investment. 471
Our interpretation of these results is as follows: in response to lower downpayments and higher 472
income volatility, leveraged households become more cautious in response to aggregate shocks, 473
thus changing less borrowing and housing demand when aggregate productivity changes.28 This 474
is especially true for housing, relative to other categories of expenditure, since housing is a highly 475
durable good and is subject to adjustment costs. Because individuals are reluctant to adjust their 476
housing consumption during uncertain times, the sensitivity of hours to aggregate shocks falls 477
27 Likewise, the correlation between debt and consumption falls in the model from 0:85 to 0:58; a decline similar
to the data (from 0:72 to 0:37).
28 Higher uncertainty in itself reduces the willingness to borrow, whereas lower downpayments lead to an
increase in debt. In our baseline calibration, the second e⁄ect dominates ￿as shown in table 4, the ratio of debt
to GDP rises from 0:31 to 0:35 when both changes are present. As a consequence, in the late period individuals
are more cautious, even if they hold more debt. For this reason, the fraction of liquidity constrained households
in the model falls from 45 to 38 percent.
22too. As a consequence, even if the volatilities of consumption and business investment are not 478
changing, total output is less volatile. 479
In Figure 7, each panel shows average debt, hours and housing positions by age in the lowest 480
and the highest aggregate state. The top panel plots the calibration with high downpayments 481
and low idiosyncratic risk (the period 1952-1982): changes in the aggregate state generate large 482
di⁄erences in debt, housing and hours. The bottom panel plots the case with low downpayments 483
and high idiosyncratic risk (the period 1983-2010): changes in the aggregate state generate 484
smaller di⁄erences in debt, housing, and hours, thus illustrating how these variables become less 485
volatile and less procyclical. 486
Figure 8 plots the model dynamics when technology switches from its average value to a 487
higher value (about 1 percent rise) in period 1. The responses are larger in the earlier period. 488
On impact, housing falls before rising strongly in period 1. This result is well known in the 489
household production literature (see, for instance, Greenwood and Hercowitz 1991 and Fisher 490
2007). In models with housing and business capital, business capital is useful for producing more 491
types of goods than housing capital. Hence, after a positive productivity shock, the rise in the 492
marginal product of capital implies that there is a strong incentive to move resources out of the 493
housing to build up business capital, and only later is housing accumulated. The key aspect 494
to note here is that higher idiosyncratic risk and lower downpayment requirements dampen the 495
incentive to adjust housing capital, so that housing investment becomes less volatile. 496
Our result that higher individual uncertainty reduces the volatility of aggregate housing 497
investment echoes the results of papers that study how durable purchases respond to changes 498
in income uncertainty in (S;s) models resulting from transaction costs. Eberly (1994), using 499
data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, considers automobile purchases in presence of 500
transaction costs: she ￿nds that higher income variability broadens the range of inaction, and 501
that the e⁄ect is larger for households that are liquidity constrained. Foote, Hurst and Leahy 502
(2000) ￿nd a similar result using data on car holdings from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, 503
and o⁄er an explanation that involves the presence of liquidity constraints and precautionary 504
saving: adjusting the capital stock for people with low levels of net worth depletes holdings of 505
23liquid assets and increases the utility cost of a negative idiosyncratic shock, thus increasing the 506
option value of not adjusting the stock for given changes in net worth. 507
7. Debt and Housing in a Great Recession Experiment 508
The ￿nding that housing and debt are less sensitive to aggregate shocks when downpayments are 509
low and idiosyncratic risk is high can account for part of the Great Moderation, but is at odds 510
with the events of the 2007-2009 ￿nancial crisis, when both housing and debt fell substantially. 511
Explaining the crisis is beyond the scope of this paper, but in this section we show that our 512
model expanded to take into account the ￿credit crunch￿can generate, at least qualitatively, 513
the observed response of housing and debt in the Great Recession. We extend the stochastic 514
structure of the model so that, when the worst technology shocks hit, credit standards get tighter 515
too, in the form of lower loan-to-value ratios and higher costs of ￿nancial intermediation (higher 516
borrowing interest rates). In other words, consistent with the post-2007 evidence,29 recessions are 517
now a combination of negative ￿nancial and negative technology shocks occurring simultaneously. 518
We implement this scenario by assuming that the maximum loan-to-value ratio mH changes over 519
time as a function of total factor productivity, At: formally, mH;t = mH (At): Moreover, we also 520
introduce an additional cost of ￿nancial intermediation in the form of an interest rate premium 521
r
p
t = rp(At) to be paid by debtors. The budget constraint for a home buyer become respectively: 522
ct + ht + ￿(ht;ht￿1) = yat + bt ￿ (Rt + I(bt￿1 > 0)r
p
t)bt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿H)ht￿1 (26)
523





where I(bt￿1 > 0) is the indicator function equal to 1 if the household is a net debtor, 0 oth- 524
erwise. The state vector xt remains unchanged with respect to the benchmark model, and so 525
does the equilibrium de￿nition. In the calibration, we let mH drop by 6 percentage points in 526
correspondence of the two lowest values of At, and leave it constant for all other values of At.30
527
29 Jermann and Quadrini (forthcoming) document that credit shocks have played an important role in capturing
U.S. output during the last decades.
30 Total factor productivity is discretized using a 7-state Markov chain (see Appendix). For the lowest two
aggregate productivity levels: in the period 1952-1982, mH;t = 0:70, and in the period 1983-2010, mH;t = 0:80.
24We set the values of the interest rate premium at 0:75% for the two lowest aggregate productivity 528
realizations, in both periods (rp is equal to zero for all other values of At). 529
We ￿nd that this simple modi￿cation of the model can qualitatively account for the behavior 530
of housing and debt in the most recent events. Figure 9 shows the impulse responses to positive 531
and negative productivity shocks, comparing the early period with the late period (de￿ned as in 532
the baseline exercise). In the late period, debt, housing and GDP respond less to positive shocks, 533
so that one ￿nds evidence of the Great Moderation so long as the economy is lucky enough not 534
to be hit by (too negative) negative shocks. When the worst recessionary shocks hit, however, 535
the decline in debt and in housing purchases are considerably larger in the late period than in 536
the early period. In other words, when leverage is high, the housing sector can better absorb 537
￿small￿business-cycle shocks, but becomes more vulnerable to large negative shocks that result 538
in a credit crunch: these shocks cause highly-leveraged households to sharply reduce their debt 539
and housing purchases.31
540
8. Sensitivity Analysis 541
We discuss in this section four alternative versions of the model where we modify the calibration 542
used in our benchmark. 543
Discount Factor. To analyze the model with homogeneous discounting, we modify the cali- 544
bration for the discount factor (￿ = 0:978) and for the relative utility from renting (￿ = 0:922) 545
in order to achieve the same homeownership rate and interest rate as in our baseline. As shown 546
in Table 5; the volatilities of housing investment and output are now slightly higher than in the 547
baseline calibration, but the correlations of housing investment and of hours with output fall: this 548
result occurs because fewer people are close to the borrowing limit (only 15 percent of households 549
are liquidity￿ constrained) and in need of increasing hours to ￿nance the downpayment in good 550
times. In addition, with a single discount factor, very few people hold debt in equilibrium, and 551
the distribution of wealth is more egalitarian than in the data: the Gini coe¢ cient for wealth is 552
31 Incidentally, we note that the volatility of GDP is still smaller in the late than in the early period calibration.
250:53, lower than in the data and in the benchmark model. The model predicts, unlike the data, 553
a negative correlation between turnover and GDP: with a single discount rate, more housing 554
capital reallocation occurs in bad times. 555
Persistence of the Income Process. One key parameter is the persistence of income shocks. 556
Our benchmark sets ￿Z = 0:9. The robustness analysis in Table 5 shows that, holding total 557
income risk constant, some of the model properties are a non￿ monotonic function of ￿Z. When 558
the shocks are not very persistent (￿Z = 0:7), the equilibrium level of debt is relatively low, 559
fewer people are at the liquidity constraint, and debt and housing investment are less volatile 560
and slightly less cyclical. Conversely, when income shocks are highly persistent (￿Z = 0:95), 561
more people are liquidity constrained, but more people are lucky for a spell long enough to 562
a⁄ord the downpayment for a house and to keep housing and debt relatively unchanged in 563
response to shocks.32 In other experiments not reported in the Table, we have found that only 564
for intermediate values of the persistence coe¢ cient (between 0:85 and 0:92), can the model 565
account for both the high volatility of housing investment and the high correlation of debt with 566
economic activity. Moreover, for values of ￿Z above 0:95; housing turnover is negatively correlated 567
with GDP, and housing is negatively correlated with business investment. 568
Housing Transaction Costs. We consider two polar cases, zero and high transaction costs. 569
With no transaction costs, the standard deviation of housing investment, which is 6:42 percent in 570
the baseline, rises to 10:42 percent (see Table 5).33 Because houses are less risky, homeownership 571
rises, from 64 to 68 percent. Aggregate volatility falls: housing and nonhousing capital become 572
closer substitutes as means of saving, and the higher volatility of housing investment is o⁄set 573
by the reduced covariance between housing and nonhousing investment. The correlation between 574
32 To keep our experiments simple and easier to interpret, we do not attempt here at recalibrating some of the
other parameters in order to match the same targets as in the benchmark model.
33 Thomas (2002) argues that lumpiness of ￿xed investment at the level of a single production unit bears no
implications for the behavior of aggregate quantities in an otherwise standard RBC model. Her argument rests
on the representative household￿ s desire to smooth consumption over time, a desire that undoes any lumpiness
at the level of the individual ￿rm. Our sensitivity analysis shows that there are di⁄erences between the models
with and without adjustment cost. Adjustment costs imply smaller housing adjustment at the aggregate level,
but larger housing adjustments (when they occur) at the individual level.
26housing and non-housing investment, which is 0:18 in the baseline (0:36 in the data), becomes 575
￿0:40 in absence of transaction costs. It is interesting to relate this result to the household 576
production literature, which models adjustment costs either as convex or using a time-to-build 577
speci￿cation.34 Fisher (2007) argues that the household production model predicts that housing 578
and business investment are negatively correlated, unless one assumes that household capital 579
is complementary to business capital and labor in market production. Here, we note that our 580
baseline model with nonconvex housing adjustment costs reproduces (unlike the model with no 581
transaction costs) the positive correlation between housing and business investment that one 582
￿nds in the data: sooner or later these costs must be paid in order to consume more housing, 583
and it is better to pay them in good times, when the marginal utility of consumption is low. 584
Moreover, impatient renters cannot wait to become homeowners, thus e⁄ectively buying houses 585
and borrowing (i.e. selling claims on capital) after a positive productivity shock. 586
Table 5 also reports the results for the high adjustment cost case (  = 8%). The high 587
  model predicts low housing turnover (2:1 percent) relative to the data (4 percent), and an 588
acyclical behavior of housing sales (sales are procyclical both in the data and in the benchmark 589
model). Such model severely underpredicts the volatility of housing investment. We conjecture 590
that moving shocks (when combined with income shocks) could restore the level of housing 591
turnover that is observed in the data even in the presence of high transaction costs. It is not 592
clear, however, whether moving shocks could make turnover procyclical, unless they are more 593
likely to happen in good times. 594
Housing Depreciation. The last column of Table 5 reports the results when the housing 595
depreciation rate is lowered from 5 to 3 percent. The performance of some of the model￿ s 596
second moments worsens considerably. Housing investment becomes too volatile, the cyclicality of 597
housing investment is much lower than in the data, and the model fails to match the comovement 598
of housing with business investment. 599
34 See for instance Gomme, Kydland and Rupert (2001).
279. Conclusions 600
In this paper, we develop an equilibrium business cycle model where houses can be used as 601
collateral, purchased or rented, and adjusted at a large cost. The resulting dynamics of housing 602
investment and household debt are realistic not only at the macroeconomic level, but also at the 603
level of individual household behavior: even if agents only infrequently adjust their housing choice, 604
housing investment is the most volatile component of aggregate demand in our model, a result 605
that is mirrored in the data. Our model accounts for the procyclicality and volatility of housing 606
investment, as well as for the procyclicality of household debt. The model can also explain 607
why housing investment has become relatively less volatile, and household debt less procyclical, 608
as a consequence of increased household-level risk and lower downpayment requirements, two 609
structural changes that have occurred in the U.S. economy around the mid-1980s. We further 610
extend the model to account for a ￿Great Recession￿episode characterized by negative technology 611
shocks coupled with tighter credit conditions. This simple modi￿cation generates an interesting 612
nonlinearity which is consistent with recent events: when leverage is high, housing, debt and 613
output respond less to positive shocks (as in the Great Moderation) but are relatively more 614
vulnerable to negative shocks, making a recession worse (as in the Great Recession). 615
Despite its complexity, the model precludes an examination of certain aspects of housing 616
behavior that may be relevant for understanding business cycle ￿ uctuations. One limitation is 617
that we have not endogenized house prices.35 There are two main reasons for our choice. First, 618
allowing for variable house prices would require specifying a two-sector model with housing and 619
nonhousing goods that are produced using di⁄erent technologies, or a model with di⁄erent price 620
stickiness in housing and nonhousing goods; and would probably require a rich array of shocks in 621
addition to productivity shocks, since we know from existing studies that technology shocks alone 622
cannot quantitatively explain observed movements in house prices: all of this would considerably 623
increase computational costs. Second, although movements in house prices are economically 624
important, cyclical ￿ uctuations in the price of housing are smaller than the corresponding ￿ uc- 625
35 The recent papers by Kiyotaki, Michaelides and Nikolov (2011), Favilukis, Ludvigson and Van Nieuwerburgh
(2009), and R￿os-Rull and SÆnchez-Marcos (2008) are steps in this direction.
28tuations in its quantity, which are the focus of our paper: for example, over the period 1970-2008, 626
the standard deviation of year-on-year growth in real housing investment is 14 percent, while the 627
corresponding number for real house prices is 3.7 percent.36
628
A second aspect of our model is that it does not explicitly consider mortgage default. Under 629
the assumption that all debt is collateralized, and given that no shock is large enough to cause 630
agents to owe on their house more than they are worth, agents would not ￿nd it optimal to 631
default on their debts, even if they had this option. However, default is an important device 632
against risk in an economy where housing values decline in recessions. In Appendix C,37 we sketch 633
an extension of our model that dispenses from aggregate productivity shocks and features large 634
housing depreciation shocks as the main source of business cycles. The model allows debtors to 635
default on their mortgage, at the cost of losing their house and being excluded from the mortgage 636
market. We assume that lenders cannot observe individual borrowers￿characteristics, but can 637
charge a higher interest rate on all loans in states of the world where default rates are higher to 638
satisfy a zero pro￿t condition. In this setup, indebted households will weigh the utility premium 639
bene￿t of being homeowners against the cost of servicing their debt in states where they have 640
negative equity. When a depreciation shock destroys part of the housing capital, borrowing 641
rates rise, and highly leveraged individuals ￿nd themselves underwater, and decide to default 642
on their debt, becoming renters. The model can be used to study how shocks to housing values 643
interact with the mortgage default rate, interest rates, debt and the housing stock. For plausibly 644
calibrated values, a shock that destroys 20 percent of the existing housing stock leads to a rise in 645
defaults (from 0 to 10 percent), a rise in borrowing premia (from 0 to 1:5 percent), and a sharp 646
decline in debt, output and housing investment. 647
36 For house prices, we use the Conventional Mortgage Home Price Index (adjusted for in￿ ation).
37Appendix C is available at https://www2.bc.edu/~iacoviel/.
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33Appendix A: Computational Details 770
We solve for the model equilibrium using a computational method similar to the one used in 771
Krusell and Smith (1998). The value and policy functions are computed on grids of points for 772
the state variables, and then approximated with linear interpolation at points not on the grids 773
(with the exception of the policy functions for housing, that are de￿ned only on points on the 774
grid). The algorithm consists of the following steps: 775
1. Specify grids for the state space of individual and aggregate state variables. 776
The number of grid points was chosen as follows: 7 points for the aggregate shock, 3 777
values for the idiosyncratic shock, 25 points for the housing stock, and 500 points for the 778
￿nancial asset.38 For aggregate capital, we choose a grid of 15 equally spaced points in 779
the initial range [0:8K￿;1:2K￿]; where K￿ denotes the average value of this variable in the 780
simulations. The range is then updated at each iteration consistently with the simulated 781
K, assigning as its boundaries the minimum and the maximum simulated values. 782





A2 e A;i=0;1 for the linear functions that approximate the laws 783











Because factor prices (wages and interest rates) only depend on aggregate capital and labor 785
in equilibrium, this approach is equivalent to assuming that individuals forecast these factor 786
prices using a function of Kt￿1 for each value of the aggregate state A. 787
3. Starting from age T backward, compute optimal policies as a function of the individual and 788
aggregate states, solving ￿rst the homeowner￿ s and renter￿ s problems separately.39 Notice 789
that the intra-temporal optimal value for labor hours as a function of consumption and 790
productivity shock for ages a ￿ e T is the following:40
791




which allows one to derive consumption before age e T directly from the budget constraint. 792
For the homeowner: 793
ca;t =
wt￿aztl ￿ Rtba;t￿1 + ba;t + (1 ￿ ￿H)ha;t￿1 ￿ ha;t ￿ ￿(ha;t;ha;t￿1)
1 + ￿
(31)
so that the per-period utility function for a ￿ e T can be transformed as follows: 794
e u(ca;t;ha;t;wtzt) = (1 + ￿)logca;t + j logha;t + ￿ log(￿=wt￿azt): (32)
38The upper bound for the housing grid and the lower bound for debt are chosen wide enough so that they
never bind in the simulations.
39In computation, we exploit the strict concavity of the value function in the choice for assets as well as the
monotonicity of the policy function in assets (for the homeowner problem, the monotonocity is for any given
choice of the housing stock).
40We prevent individuals from choosing negative hours.
34For the tenant, taking into consideration the intra-temporal condition for optimal house 795
services to rent: 796
ca;t =
wt￿aztl ￿ Rtba;t￿1 + ba;t + (1 ￿ ￿H)ha;t￿1 ￿ ￿(0;ha;t￿1)
1 + ￿ + j
(33)
so that the per-period utility function for a ￿ e T can be transformed as follows: 797
e u(ca;t;pt;wtzt) = (1 + ￿ + j)logca;t + j log(j￿=pt) + ￿ log(￿=wt￿azt): (34)
As a consequence, the homeowner￿ s dynamic optimization problem entails solving for policy 798
functions for b and h only, while the renter￿ s one consists in solving for b only. The problems 799
of the retired people (a > e T) are similar to the above, where we set ￿ = 0: 800
4. Draw a series of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks according to the related stochastic 801
processes. Draw a series of "death" shocks according to the survival probabilities. Use 802
the (approximated) policy functions and the predicted aggregate variables to simulate the 803
optimal decisions of a large number of agents for many periods. In the simulations, we 804
perform linear interpolation between grid points for b0; but we restrict the choices of h0 to 805
lie on the grid. We simulate 90;000 individuals for 5;000 periods, discarding the ￿rst 200 806
periods.41 Compute the aggregate variables K and L at each t. 807
5. Run a regression of the simulated aggregate capital and the simulated aggregate labor on 808





for the laws of motion for K 809
and L. We repeat steps 3 and 4 until convergence over the coe¢ cients of the regressions. 810
We measure goodness of ￿t using the R2 of the regressions: they are always equal to 0:997 811
or higher at convergence for K and around 0:95 for L; the corresponding wage rate and 812
interest rate functions are also very accurate: the R2 of the regression of the wage rate on 813
aggregate K is 0:999, the R2 of the regression of the interest rate on aggregate K is 0:992. 814
41We enforce the law of large numbers by making sure that the simulated fractions of ages and of labor
productivity shocks correspond to the theoretical ones, by randomly adjusting the values of the shocks.
35Appendix B: Calibrating the Income Process 815
The Persistence of Wage Shocks 816
The (parsimonious) process for individual income productivity that we specify in the model is: 817





￿1=2 "t; "t ￿ Normal(0;1). (35)
We want to pick values for ￿Z and ￿Z that are in line with evidence. 818
1. Floden and LindØ (2001) estimate an AR(1) process for wages of the form in (35) and 819
estimate (using PSID data covering the 1988-1992 period), after controlling for observable 820
characteristics and measurement error, values of ￿Z = 0:91 (and ￿Z (1 ￿ ￿2
Z)
1=2 = 0:21; 821
thus implying ￿Z = 0:5). 822
2. Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2010) estimate an ARMA(1,1) process for wages 823
using PSID data. Their estimate of the autoregressive component is 0:97. 824
3. Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006) specify and estimate a model of household log 825
labor earnings (not wages) that controls for ￿xed e⁄ects, a polynomial in age, and autocor- 826
relation in earnings. Their sample is the social security earnings records. Their estimates 827
for married, no college, two-earners are ￿Z = 0:70 (and ￿Z = 0:43). 828
The Change in Volatility 829
Several studies document the increase in the cross-sectional dispersion of earnings in the United 830
States between the 1970s and the 1990s. This increase is often decomposed into a rise in per- 831
manent inequality (attributable to education, experience, sex, etc.) and a rise of the persistent 832
or transitory shocks volatility. Despite some disagreement on the relative importance of these 833
two components, the literature ￿nds that both play a role in explaining the increase in income 834
dispersion. 835
1. Mo¢ tt and Gottschalk (2008) study changes in the variance of permanent and transitory 836
component of income volatility using data from the PSID from 1970 to 2004. They ￿nd 837
that the non-permanent component (transitory) variance of earnings (for male workers) in- 838
creased substantially in the 1980s and then remained at this new higher level through 2004. 839
They report (see Figure 7 in their paper) that the variance of the transitory component 840
rose from around 0:10 to 0:22 between the 1970s and the 1980s-1990s. This corresponds to 841
a rise in the standard deviation from 0:32 to 0:47. Their estimate of the autocorrelation of 842
the transitory shocks is 0:85. 843
2. Using PSID data, Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2010) decompose the evolution 844
of the cross-sectional variance of individual earnings over the period 1967-2000 into the 845
variances of ￿xed e⁄ects, persistent shocks, and transitory shocks. They ￿nd that the 846
variance of persistent shocks roughly doubles during the 1975-1985 decade. 847
3. Haider (2001) ￿nds that increases in earnings instability over the 1970s and increases in 848
lifetime earnings inequality in the 1980s account in equal parts for the increase of inequality 849
in the data. To measure the magnitude of earnings instability in year t, he uses the cross- 850
sectional variance of the idiosyncratic deviations in year t. His estimate of ￿Z is 0:64. He 851
36￿nds that the unconditional standard deviation of the instability component rises from 852
around 0:23 ￿ 0:24 to about 0:35 ￿ 0:37 during the 1980s. 853
4. Krueger and Perri (2006) model log income as an ARMA process of the kind 854












t are Normal(0;1). They allow the innovation variances ￿" and ￿Z to vary 855
by year. They ￿nd that the values of ￿Z and ￿" are respectively 0:42 and 0:28 in 1980, and 856
0:52 and 0:36 in 2003. Given these numbers, the standard deviation of log income yt rises 857
by 0:13; from
p
0:422 + 0:282 = 0:50 to
p
0:522 + 0:362 = 0:63. 858
From this brief review, we conclude that a plausible value for the persistence of the produc- 859
tivity shock is around 0:9. We set the standard deviation of income to be equal to 0:3 in the 860
early part of the sample, which is the lower bound of the estimates reported above. We set the 861
standard deviation to 0:45 in the second part of the sample: a change of 0:15 is in the range of 862
estimates reported by Mo¢ tt and Gottschalk (2008). 863
37Tables 864
Table 1. U.S. Economy. Cyclical Statistics and Housing Market Facts. 865
Early Period Late Period Whole Sample
1952.I -1982.IV 1983.I -2010.IV 1952.I -2010.IV
Standard dev.
GDP 2.09 1.62 1.88
C 0.93 0.83 0.88
IH 7.12 4.45 6.00
IK 4.90 5.36 5.11
Debt 2.23 2.20 2.21
Hours 1.60 1.37 1.49
Housing Turnover 0.54 (68.I-82.IV) 0.29 0.40
Correlations
IH,GDP 0.89 0.75 0.84
Debt,GDP 0.78 0.43 0.63
Hours,GDP 0.82 0.86 0.83
Turnover,GDP 0.69 0.10 0.46
IH,IK 0.36 0.40 0.36
Debt,C 0.72 0.37 0.56
Averages
Homeownership 64% 66% 65%
Debt to GDP 34% 59% 46%
Housing Turnover 3.9% 4.3% 3.2%
Gini wealth 0.79 0.83 0.81
Gini labor income 0.40 0.46 0.83
Gini consumption 0.23 0.26 0.25
866
Notes: C; IH and IK are consumption, residential ￿xed investment and business ￿xed in- 867
vestment respectively, divided by the GDP de￿ ator (sources: BEA). GDP is the sum of the three 868
series. Durables expenditures are included in IH. Debt is the stock of Home mortgages held by 869
households and nonpro￿t organizations (source: Flow of Funds Accounts), divided by the GDP 870
de￿ ator. Hours are total hours worked for the entire economy from Francis and Ramey (2009). 871
Cyclical statistics (standard deviations and correlations) for all series refer to the series logged 872
and detrended with HP-￿lter (smoothing parameter 1,600). Data on inequality are from Wol⁄, 873
2010 (wealth); http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/ (income); and from Krueger 874
and Perri, 2006 (consumption). Housing Turnover is the ratio of total home sales divided by the 875
existing housing stock (see text for the source). 876
38Table 2: Parameter Values for the Benchmark Model Economy 877
Parameter Value Target/Source
Preferences
Discount factor, patients ￿H 0:999 R = 3%
Discount factor, impatients ￿L 0:941 Hendricks (2007)
Fraction of impatient agents ￿ 2=3 Gini coe¢ cient of Wealth: 0:73
Weight on leisure in utility ￿ 1:65 -
Productive time l 2:65 Time worked: 40%
Weight on housing in utility j 0:15 H=Y = 1:4
Utility, renting vs. owning ￿ 0:838 Home ownership rate = 64%
Utility weights (family size) ￿a see text Cagetti (2003)
Life, retirement
Survival probabilities ￿a see text Decennial Life Tables
Retirement period e T 46 Retirement age 65 years
Pension P 0.4￿inc. 40% average income
Technology
Capital share ￿ 0:26 K=Y = 2:2
Capital depreciation rate ￿K 0:09 IK=Y = 0:20
Housing depreciation rate ￿H 0:05 IH=Y = 0:07
Autocorrelation, technology shock ￿A 0:925 King and Rebelo (1999)
Standard dev., technology shock ￿A 0:0148 ￿ (Y ) = 2:09%
Housing transaction cost   0:05 National Association Realtors (2005)
Minimum House Size h 1.5￿inc. See text
Borrowing
Max debt, fraction lifetime wage mY 0:25 See text
Maximum debt, fraction of house mH 0:75 See text
Individual income process
Autocorrelation, earnings shock ￿Z 0:90 Floden and Linde (2001)
Standard deviation, earnings shock ￿Z 0:30 See appendix B
Age-dependent earnings ability ￿a see text Hansen (1993)
878
39Table 3: U.S. Economy and Baseline Model. Comparison for the Early Period. 879


















Debt to GDP 34% 31%
Housing Turnover 3.9% 4.0%
Gini wealth 0.79 0.73
Gini labor income 0.40 0.41
Gini consumption 0.23 0.26
Liquidity constrained NA 0.45
880
Notes: The model moments are based on statistics from a simulation of 5,000 periods. Liq- 881
uidity constrained agents in the model are those who own liquid assets less than 16.67 percent 882
(two months in a year) of annual income. 883
40Table 4: Model Predictions, Changing Downpayment Requirements and Income Volatility 884
(1) Baseline (2) (3) (4)
Early Period Late Period
mH = 0:75 mH = 0:85 mH = 0:75 mH = 0:85
￿Z = 0:3 ￿Z = 0:3 ￿Z = 0:45 ￿Z = 0:45
Standard Deviation
GDP 2.09 2.08 2.05 2.03
C 1.63 1.63 1.66 1.68
IH 6.42 5.94 5.52 5.04
IK 4.16 4.05 4.21 4.16
Debt 8.34 3.04 2.61 1.44
Hours 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.31
Housing Turnover 0.29 0.44 0.21 0.21
Correlations
IH, GDP 0.66 0.69 0.55 0.54
Debt, GDP 0.71 0.63 0.50 0.39
Hours, GDP 0.65 0.64 0.47 0.42
Turnover, GDP 0.39 0.77 0.42 0.28
IH, IK 0.18 0.24 0.08 0.09
Debt, C 0.85 0.77 0.68 0.58
Averages
Homeownership 64% 76% 59% 67%
Debt to GDP 31% 50% 23% 35%
Housing Turnover 4.0% 3.0% 5.1% 5.6%
Gini wealth 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73
Gini labor income 0.41 0.41 0.48 0.48
Gini consumption 0.26 0.26 0.31 0.31
Liquidity constrained 0.45 0.45 0.39 0.38
885
Notes: Baseline calibration and sensitivity analysis. (1) is the baseline calibration that is 886
targeted to the U.S. data for the period 1952-1982. In (2), we increase the loan-to-value ratio 887
from 0.75 to 0.85. In (3), we increase earnings volatility from 0.3 to 0.45. In (4), we increase 888
both loan-to-value ratio and earnings volatility so to calibrate the U.S. economy for the period 889
1983-2010. 890
41Table 5: Robustness Analysis 891
Data Model One-￿ Persistence Transaction cost Low ￿
￿Z=.7 ￿Z=.95  =0%  =8% ￿H=3%
Standard dev.
GDP 2.09 2.09 2.16 2.08 2.02 2.05 2.01 2.05
C 0.93 1.63 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.72 1.68
IH 7.12 6.42 6.72 4.99 4.73 10.42 3.45 11.33
IK 4.90 4.16 4.83 4.24 4.12 4.99 3.95 5.17
Debt 2.23 8.34 14.78 2.68 2.11 1.68 2.11 0.68
Hours 1.60 0.33 0.39 0.32 0.27 0.36 0.27 0.30
Housing Turnover 0.54 0.29 0.40 0.16 0.22 2.14 0.13 0.16
Correlations
IH,GDP 0.89 0.66 0.58 0.61 0.49 0.34 0.54 0.30
Debt,GDP 0.78 0.71 0.72 0.60 0.58 0.69 0.39 0.11
Hours,GDP 0.82 0.65 0.60 0.50 0.43 0.45 0.34 0.45
Turnover,GDP 0.69 0.39 -0.32 0.18 -0.15 0.67 -0.08 0.10
IH,IK 0.36 0.18 0.08 0.19 0.03 -0.40 0.19 -0.44
Debt,C 0.72 0.85 0.83 0.78 0.72 0.82 0.54 0.24
Averages
Homeownership 64% 64% 64% 66% 71% 68% 74% 70%
Debt to GDP 34% 31% 9% 17% 42% 40% 37% 46%
Housing Turnover 3.9% 4.0% 3.3% 4.7% 2.9% 42.0% 2.1% 3.8%
Gini wealth 0.79 0.73 0.53 0.68 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.72
Gini labor income 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.45 0.39 0.41 0.41 0.42
Gini consumption 0.23 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
Liquidity constrained NA 0.45 0.15 0.30 0.49 0.47 0.45 0.45
892
Notes: In the one-￿ model, we recalibrate ￿ and the average ￿ so that the homeownership 893
rate is 64% and the interest rate is 3%, as in the baseline model. No parameter changes are made 894
in the other models, except those noted in row 2 of the Table. 895
42Figures 896
Figure 1: Mortgage Debt, Housing Investment and GDP.




















Note: Variables are in￿ ation￿ adjusted, HP-￿ltered (￿ = 1;600) and expressed in percent 898
deviation from their trend. 899
43Figure 2: E¢ ciency and preference pro￿les. 900







Deterministic wage efficiency profile





Deterministic preference shifter profile
Age
901
44Figure 3: Homeowner￿ s Housing Investment Decision as a Function of Initial House Size and 902
Liquid Assets. 903

































Homeowner does not move
Homeowner moves down
Homeowner becomes renter
Note: The ￿gure illustrates, for each combination of initial house and liquid assets, the home- 904
owner￿ s housing decision for next period. It is plotted for a patient agent who is 65 years old, 905
when aggregate productivity and the average capital labor ratio are equal to their average value. 906






























































Note: This ￿gure plots life-cycle choices of a randomly chosen impatient agent from birth 908
(age 21) to death (age 90). In panel 1, the thin line denotes the maximum debt limit given the 909
housing choice. In panel 3, the ￿x￿symbol denotes the amount rented when the individual is 910
renting, whereas the solid line denotes the amount owned when the individual owns a house. 911
46Figure 5: Comparison between Model (Baseline Calibration) and Data. 912




















Note: The data come from the summary statistics of the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances, 913
as reported in Kennickell and Shack-Marquez (1992). For each age, the model variable is the 914
product of the fraction of households in that age holding housing or debt, times the median 915
holding of housing or debt. The data variable is constructed in the same way. 916
47Figure 6: Lorenz Curves for Total Wealth and Housing Wealth. 917

















Note: The Lorenz curves for total wealth and housing wealth in the data are from D￿az and 918
Luengo-Prado (2010) using data from 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances. 919

















































































































Note: The top panel plots model variables in the baseline calibration (low individual risk and 921
high downpayment requirements), where housing, debt and hours worked are relatively more 922
volatile (the di⁄erence between a boom and a recession is larger). The bottom panel plots the 923
calibration with high individual risk and low downpayment requirements. 924
The thin/thick line shows the reading of each variable by age when the economy is in the 925
lowest/highest aggregate state (recession/boom). Housing and Debt are expressed as a ratio of 926
average GDP. Hours are normalized in each age by their age average. 927
49Figure 8: Impulse Responses to a Positive Technology Shock: Early and Late Period 928
Calibration. 929



































Note: Model dynamics following an exogenous switch in aggregate productivity A (in period 930
zero) from the median state to next higher value (a 1 percent increase) lasting four periods. Each 931
variable is displayed in percent deviation from the unshocked path. 932
50Figure 9: Impulse Responses to Positive and Negative Technology Shocks: Comparison 933
between the Early and Late Period Calibration, Model with Cyclical Loan-to-Value Ratios and 934
Interest Rate Premia. 935





































Note: Model dynamics following an exogenous switch in productivity A in period zero. The 936
thick lines plot a 1 percent increase in productivity that does not change ￿nancial conditions 937
in the early (solid lines) and late (dashed lines) period calibration. The thin lines plot a 1 938
percent decrease in productivity together with a worsening in ￿nancial conditions. Each variable 939
is displayed in percentage deviation from the unshocked path. 940
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Abstract
This appendix sketches a brief description of an extension of the baseline model in Iacoviello and
Pavan (2011) where we allow for mortgage default following housing depreciation shocks.
1. Introduction
The following is a brief outline of an extension of the model in Iacoviello and Pavan (2011), where
households are allowed to default on their mortgage debt. At any period, indebted households can
decide to default on their debt, in which case they lose their house, are banned from borrowing
and must become tenants.1 Default is triggered by shocks to housing depreciation that are large
enough to cause leverage individuals to own on their house more than it is worth. The perfectly
competitive ￿nancial sector cannot discriminate borrowers, that is, lenders cannot apply di⁄erent
borrowing interest rates to di⁄erent borrowers, and charge the same interest premium to all their
debtors in order to break even.
2. The model with mortgage default
The environment features the same characteristics as in the baseline model, except for the exis-
tence of shocks to the depreciation rate of housing and capital. These shocks are assumed to move
one-to-one with the technology shocks: ￿H;t = ￿H (At) and ￿K;t = ￿K (At).2 As in Iacoviello and
Pavan (2011), we adopt the approximate aggregation/bounded rationality approach developed
￿Matteo Iacoviello, Division of International Finance, Federal Reserve Board, 20th and C St. NW, Washington,
DC 20551. E-mail: matteo.iacoviello@frb.gov.
yMarina Pavan, Universitat Jaume I & LEE, Castell￿n, Spain. E-mail: pavan@eco.uji.es.
1 In this simple version, the household is banned from borrowing in the default period only, and no credit
history is recorded.
2 In the numerical implementation, capital depreciation is assumed to rise together with housing depreciation
to avoid perverse substitution e⁄ects between capital and housing investment, which would lead to an increaseby Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998), and solve for the model equilibrium by forecasting future
prices through the ￿rst moment of aggregate capital and, in this case, aggregate housing as well.
The inclusion of the aggregate housing stock into the set of relevant state variables is necessary
in this setup given the existence of shocks to the value of houses, and the need to forecast the
interest rate premium as well.3
2.1. The household￿ s problem
As in the main text, denote xt ￿ (zt;bt￿1;ht￿1;At;Ht￿1;Kt￿1) the vector collecting individual
and aggregate state variables. The dynamic problem of an age a household with discount factor
￿i can now be stated as:













a , V r
a and V d
a are the value functions at age a for owning, renting a house and defaulting
respectively, and Ii = 1 corresponds to the decision to buy/own, rent or default for i = h;r or
d. The value of being a homeowner solves:
V
h









s.t. ct + ht + ￿(ht;ht￿1) = yat + bt ￿ (Rt + I fbt￿1 > 0gr
p
t)bt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿H;t)ht￿1




where we use the same notation than in the main paper to denote the transaction costs for
housing, etc. The function I fb > 0g is equal to 1 if b > 0, i.e. if the household is a net debtor at
the beginning of the period. We denote with r
p
t the interest rate premium charged to borrowers.
The depreciation rate for housing ￿H;t changes over the business cycle, being higher in the worst
recession.
As in the benchmark model, the value of renting a house is determined by solving the problem:
V
r









s.t. ct + ptst + ￿(0;ht￿1) = yat + bt ￿ Rtbt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿H;t)ht￿1





Households that have a net negative asset position (bt￿1 > 0) at the beginning of the period
have the option of defaulting on their debt, losing their house and being only able to rent. The
in aggregate capital when a bad shock to housing hits. Moreover, the numerical implementation assumes that
the variance of technology shocks in arbitrarily small, so that the only shocks are e⁄ectively the two depreciation
shocks.
3 The typicalR2 of the forecasting equations for K, R and the interest premium is 0:99; 0:995 and 0:99
respectively for the regressions including H. It drops to 0:89; 0:99 and 0:98 when we do not include housing in
the forecasting regressions.
2corresponding value is the following:
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d









s.t. ct + ptst = yat + bt





At the agent￿ s last age, VT+1 (xT+1;￿) = 0 for any (xT+1;￿).
At any point in time, the following are the forecasting functions:
for aggregate capital: Kt = z
K (Kt￿1;Ht￿1;At)
for aggregate labor: Lt = z
L (Kt￿1;Ht￿1;At)
for aggregate housing: Ht = z
H (Kt￿1;Ht￿1;At):
Moreover, we assume the agents directly forecast the value of the interest rate premium as a
function of aggregate capital, housing stock and total factor productivity, r
p
t = zp (Kt￿1;Ht￿1;At).4
2.2. The ￿nancial sector with the possibility of mortgage default
In the perfectly competitive ￿nancial sector with the option to default, the interest rate on loans
is higher than the one on deposits, so that the ￿nancial intermediaries￿pro￿ts are zero. We
assume that lenders cannot observe (or face a high cost of observing) the default probability
of each individual household or, correspondingly, cannot price discriminate among borrowers
and must charge the same interest rate premium r
p
t on every loan.5 When someone defaults,
the ￿nancial intermediary retrieves the value of the housing collateral, net of depreciation and
transaction costs.
Let￿ s denote with Dt￿1 the aggregate debt at the beginning of period t, of which DN
t￿1 is
the total amount re-paid (not defaulted upon) and DD
t￿1 is the total amount defaulted, so that
Dt￿1 = DN
t￿1 + DD













4 To the best of our knowledge, Nakajima and Rios-Rull (2005) is the only model to include aggregate risk
and default (in the form of consumer bankruptcy) in a heterogeneous agents￿equilibrium setting. In their model,
however, the assumptions on the timing of the default decision ensure that the prices of loans do not depend on
the distribution of agents. We take a di⁄erent approach and adopt a ￿bounded rationality￿technique to forecast
borrowing premia, similar to the one used in Krusell and Smith (1997).
5 We adopted this modeling strategy for the interest rate premium since it is the most consistent with our
setting, in which, as in RBC models in general, interest rates are determined "ex-post" as a function of next
period￿aggregate shock realization.
One alternative could have been to condition the interest rate premium on the characteristics of the borrower.
In that case, though, given the timing assumption of our model, we should have kept track of complex multi-
dimensional objects dependent on individual and aggregate variables, and the zero-pro￿t condition would not
have been a trivial object to de￿ne ex-post.
In the default literature with no aggregate volatility, ￿nancial intermediaries commit "ex-ante" to being paid
a certain interest rate, so that ex-post pro￿ts can be di⁄erent from zero (Athreya, 2008; Chatterjee et al., 2007;
Chatterjee and Eyigungor, 2011).
3where HD
t￿1 is the collateral (aggregate value of houses guaranteeing the defaulted debt)
repossessed by the ￿nancial sector.














and is charged to all borrowers, households and ￿rms alike.6;7
2.3. De￿nition of Equilibrium:
We are now ready to de￿ne the equilibrium for this economy.




a (xt;￿), ha (xt;￿),sa (xt;￿),ba (xt;￿),ca (xt;￿),la (xt;￿)g










t=1 ; aggregate variables
Kt;Lt;Ho
t and Hr
t for each period t; lump-sum taxes ￿ and pension P; and laws of motion zK,
F H, zL and F p such that at any t:
Agents optimize: Given Rt, wt; pt and r
p
t and the laws of motion zK, F H, zL and F p, the
value functions solve the individual￿ s problem, with the corresponding policy functions.
Factor prices and rental prices satisfy:
Rt + r
p
t ￿ 1 + ￿K = ￿At (Kt￿1=Lt)
(￿￿1)




Rt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿H)
Rt+1
￿
and the interest rate premium r
p





la (xt;￿)￿azt@￿t (labor market)
Ct + Ht ￿ (1 ￿ ￿H;t)Ht￿1 + ￿t + Kt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿K;t)Kt￿1 = Yt (goods market)













a (xt;￿) + I
d
a (xt;￿)]sa (xt;￿)@￿t,
6 However, we do not model ￿rms￿decision to default. We assume that ￿rms also have to pay the higher
interest for borrowing, given that lenders cannot discriminate interest rates on loans.


















and, by Walras￿law, the supply of savings equals total capital.





The laws of motion for the aggregate capital, aggregate labor, aggregate housing and interest
rate premia are given by
Kt = z







3. Brief outline of numerical implementation
Households perceive that prices depend on the ￿rst moment of the aggregate capital and the
aggregate housing stock only, and that these variables change over time according to the laws of
motion speci￿ed above. In particular, agents take their decisions based initially on an arbitrary
value of the interest rate premium rp, and consider the future rp to be given by a linear function
of K, H and A (see Krusell and Smith, 1997).
Given the optimal policy functions solving the individual problem, we simulate the agents￿
choices and directly compute the interest premium that makes the ￿nancial intermediaries￿pro￿ts
to be nul at any period, for a large number of periods.
We then use the obtained time series (of which we discarded the ￿rst part) to regress the
aggregate variables Kt+1, Ht+1, Lt+1 and the premia r
p
t+1 on constants, Kt and Ht, for each value
of the aggregate shock At.
We iterate these steps (solution of optimal rules and simulation) until convergence of the
parameters in the laws of motion, measuring goodness of ￿t of the regressions with the implied
R2.
4. Results
The model can be used to see how shocks to housing values interact with the mortgage default
rate, interest rate, debt and housing stock. To illustrate the main mechanism at work in the
model with default, we assume technology shocks away, and solve the model with depreciation
shocks for housing and capital only. We ￿x the labor supply at unity, so that movements in
the aggregate capital stock are the only source of movements in output. We choose the model
parameters at the values of Table 2 in Iacoviello and Pavan (2011), except the discount rate gap
which is 4 percent, and the loan-to-value which is set at 85 percent. The depreciation shocks for
housing and capital are set to ￿H = 25% and ￿K = 13% respectively in the worst state of the
world, and to ￿H = 15% and ￿K = 11% in the next worst case, while ￿H = 5% and ￿K = 9% in
5all other states. Recall that the transaction cost to change housing stock is 5 percent, except in
the case of default when the defaulting agent can walk away from the debt at no cost.8
Figure A.1 illustrates the homeowner￿ s optimal default decision for di⁄erent combinations of
initial house, loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and idosyncratic income shock. In response to a housing
depreciation shock that wipes 25% of the house value, homeowners who are characterized by a
bad idiosyncratic income realization and by an initial leverage ranging from 68 to 73 percent or
higher will choose to default. To consider what this means, assume that the house is worth 100,
so that the initial mortgage balance in the house is 68 to 73 dollars. The depreciation shock
reduces the value of the house to 75, so ￿poor￿agents who own on their house between 68 ￿ 73
and higher will choose to default. Notice in the Figure that the bigger is the initial house, the
lower is the LTV threshold that triggers default: households with a very high housing stock are
more far away from their target level of housing, the default option allows them to save the high
transaction costs to pay, so they are willing to default even in the case in which they still have
some equity left in the house (after the depreciation shock), provided that the equity in the house
is less than the transaction cost.
Figure A.2 shows a simulation of the main macroeconomic variables over 100 model periods.
In the bad states of the world, when housing depreciation takes on very large values, interest
rate premia reach values of about 1:5 percent, the aggregate default rate rises from 0 to about
10 percent, and the aggregate housing and capital stock persistently decline. Further details on
computational results can be obtained from the authors.
8 It would be straightforward to add to the model other penalties for defaulting (income loss, stigma) besides
exclusion from the credit market in the current period.
6Figures
Figure A.1: Default Policy in di⁄erent states of the world
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Note: The ￿gure illustrates, for each combination of initial house and LTV, the homeowner￿ s
default decision. It is plotted for an impatient agent who is 35 years old. From the left to the
right: lowest idiosyncratic and lowest aggregate state; median idiosyncratic and lowest aggregate
state; highest idiosyncratic and lowest aggregate state.












































Note: The ￿gure illustrates a macroeconomic simulation of 100 periods. Average output is
normalized to unity. Housing, Capital and Default Losses are expressed as a ratio to average
output. Defaults rise in bad states of the world when the housing and capital stock is subject to
depreciation shocks.
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